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ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
Interim State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8701
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 334-2712
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DANIEL JOSEPH SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 43706
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-3098
APPELLANT'S
REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Daniel Smith appeals, contending the district court erred by denying his motion
for appointment of counsel on his motion for leniency under I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule
35), and also by denying that motion on its merits. The State’s response articulates and
argues under the improper standard for determining whether the information presented
with that motion is new and additional, as it relies on the standard for Rule 35 motions
challenging a stipulated sentence.

Since Mr. Smith did not agree to a stipulated

sentence as part of his plea agreement, the standard articulated by the State is
inapplicable, as the Court of Appeals has expressly refused to apply that standard
beyond that narrow context. Under the appropriate standard of review, which considers
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whether the district court had been previously presented with the information in
question, Mr. Smith presented new and additional information with his motion. As such,
it was not frivolous.

Therefore, the district court erred in denying his motion for

appointment of counsel on that motion and by denying that motion on its merits.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Smith’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
ISSUE
Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Smith’s Rule 35 motion without
appointing counsel.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Smith’s Rule 35 Motion Without Appointing
Counsel
A.

When Applying The Proper Standard For New Or Additional Information,
Mr. Smith’s Motion Is Not Frivolous, And So, He Should Have Been Appointed
Counsel
As an initial matter, the State characterizes Mr. Smith’s information in support of

his Rule 35 motion as only reiterating the points he made at the sentencing hearing.
(Resp. Br., p.3.) That argument is contradicted by the record, which shows that the
information – most notably, the information that, once Mr. Smith was informed of his HIV
diagnosis, he had taken efforts to reduce his risk of spreading that disease – was not
presented at sentencing. (Compare R., p.142 (Mr. Smith’s assertion of this information
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in his Rule 35 motion), with Tr., p.12, L.5 - p.15, L.19 (the defense’s comments at the
sentencing hearing, not mentioning Mr. Smith’s diagnosis at all).) Had that information
been presented, the district court could not have justifiably reached the conclusion it did,
that Mr. Smith had knowingly exposed people to that condition in the year before he
learned of his condition. (See Tr., p.18, Ls.13-19 (the district court stating, “I found
myself wondering . . . how many others were affected by this reckless behavior”).)
Therefore, Mr. Smith’s Rule 35 motion was accompanied by information that had not
previously been presented to the district court.

In fact, the State appears to

subsequently concede that point as its entire argument in regard to Mr. Smith’s motion
for appointment of counsel is based on the premise that the information was not “new”
because Mr. Smith was aware of it at the time of the sentencing hearing (implying that
he should have presented it at that hearing). (See Resp. Br., pp.3-4.)
Given the State’s apparent concession, the only question on appeal is whether
the information accompanying the Rule 35 motion, which to that point, had not been
presented to the district court, constituted “new or additional” information in support of
the motion. The State asserts the standard to evaluate that question is that the new or
additional information has to be information “that was not available at the time of
sentencing.” (Resp. Br., pp.3-4 (emphasis omitted).) It cites State v. Wade, 125 Idaho
522, 526 (Ct. App. 1994), as the source for that standard. (Resp. Br., p.3.) However,
that misrepresents the narrow scope of the Wade standard. Wade applies only to the
limited scenario where a Rule 35 motion is requesting leniency from a stipulated
sentence. State v. Person, 145 Idaho 293, 299 (Ct. App. 2007).
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In Person, the Court of Appeals made it clear that the Wade standard was a
product of the contractual concerns surrounding plea agreements for stipulated
sentences:
It is not only the prosecutor who is bound by a plea agreement-a
defendant is also obligated to adhere to its terms, and the state is entitled
to receive the benefit of its bargain. Therefore, in State v. Wade, . . . we
further stated that the defendant’s Rule 35 motion could have merit only if
it were justified by new or additional information that was not available
when the plea bargain was made.
Person, 145 Idaho at 299 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). In the traditional
Rule 35 scenario, where the defendant is requesting leniency from a sentence to which
he did not stipulate, the evaluation of “new or additional” information is focused on
whether the district court judge was aware of the information attached to the Rule 35
motion. See, e.g., State v. Torres, 107 Idaho 895, 898 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding a
change in judicial personnel does not prevent the defendant from presenting information
in support of his Rule 35 motion which was not available to the sentencing judge); see
also State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007) (discussing the standard for “new or
additional” information in terms of information “provided to the district court”).
Thus, it is specifically because of the contractual concerns in the stipulatedsentence scenario that the focus understandably shifts to whether the defendant was
aware of that information at the time of the plea agreement. Person, 145 Idaho at 299;
see also State v. Holdaway, 130 Idaho 482, 485 (Ct. App. 1997). In that scenario, the
district court is simply ratifying the sentence the parties agreed to. Accordingly, the
focus of the Rule 35 evaluation in that context is on the information the defendant had
because any information the defendant had must have been taken into account in his
decision to enter that agreement. As a result, to show that sentence is excessive, he
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must necessarily present evidence that had not factored into the sentence imposed. It
is upon this very point that the Wade decision itself turned: the information at issue in
that case was “information which was in the possession of Wade and his counsel and
presumably weighed by them in considering the sentence to which Wade agreed.”
Wade, 125 Idaho at 526 (emphasis added).
However, those same concerns do not exist in the traditional Rule 35 scenario.
Rather, it is the information presented to the district court that factors into the sentence
the district court is crafting. Thus, the focus is properly on the information of which the
district court was aware in that scenario.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals has

expressly rejected the State’s argument in the traditional Rule 35 scenario:

“we

respectfully disagree with Judge Swanstrom’s dissenting opinion . . . , in which he
argues that a Rule 35 motion must rest upon information which was not, and could not
have been presented at sentencing. Our cases do not support such a cramped view
of Rule 35, and we decline to adopt it today.” State v. Bonaparte, 114 Idaho 577, 582
(Ct. App. 1988), overruled on other grounds as stated in State v. Larson, 158 Idaho 130,
135-36 (Ct. App. 2014). As the Court of Appeals has made plain, “It would ill serve the
purpose of a Rule 35 motion to preclude the defendant from presenting fresh
information about himself or his circumstances.” Torres, 107 Idaho at 898.
The Idaho Supreme Court uses this same standard. In State v. Wersland, for
example, the Supreme Court held that information regarding the defendant’s mental
health treatment two years prior to the sentencing hearing was “new” information which
justified a sentence reduction under Rule 35. State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 504-05
(1994). Similarly, in State v. Arthur, the Supreme Court held that information regarding
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the defendant’s ongoing treatment for a terminal illness was “additional” information
which justified a sentence reduction under Rule 35. State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 223
(2008).

In both cases, the information which justified the sentence reduction was

obviously information the defendant could have been aware of and presented at the
initial sentencing hearing.

Nevertheless, it fulfilled the requirement reaffirmed in

Huffman1: “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to
the district court in support of the rule 35 motion.”

Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203

(emphasis added).
As such, the proper standard in the traditional Rule 35 scenario is: if the district
court did not have the information at sentencing, it is new or additional information and
is sufficient to support a Rule 35 motion. Only in the extraordinary circumstance where
the defendant is challenging a stipulated sentence does that focus change.
Mr. Smith did not bargain for a stipulated sentence. (See Tr., p.6, Ls.3-11 (noting
the plea agreement only called for a particular sentence recommendation from the State
on one of the charges; the agreement allowed for “open arguments” on the second)
(emphasis added); accord. Entry of Plea Tr., p.7, L.24 - p.9, L.4 (the parties articulating
the terms of the plea agreement); see also Tr., p.14, Ls.7-24 (defense counsel arguing
for a sentence more lenient than the one the prosecutor recommended).) Therefore,
this is a traditional Rule 35 scenario, and so, the Wade standard is inapplicable. The
proper analysis focuses on whether the information Mr. Smith attached to his Rule 35
motion had previously been presented to the district court. Since, as discussed supra, it
Arthur had actually been suspended pending the decision in Huffman, and so,
expressly applied the standard as rearticulated by Huffman. Arthur, 145 Idaho at 223.
1
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was not (and since the State’s argument appears to concede that point), the information
accompanying Mr. Smith’s motion is “new or additional” information. As a result, his
Rule 35 motion was not frivolous. Therefore, as discussed in depth in the Appellant’s
Brief, pages 5-11, the district court erred by denying Mr. Smith’s request for counsel on
his Rule 35 motion.
Furthermore, the State does not respond to Mr. Smith’s point, that one of the
reasons counsel should be appointed pursuant to I.C. § 19-852 in such cases is to help
a defendant marshal and present all the relevant information, as a defendant acting pro
se may not be aware of, or able to obtain, all the relevant information. (See App.
Br., pp.9-11; see generally Resp. Br.) Therefore, if the only question is whether the
information the defendant has is sufficient to meet the threshold standard for Rule 35
motions, counsel should still have been appointed.

If the State’s argument to the

contrary is endorsed, it allows the district court to deny a request for counsel because it
has already decided to deny the motion on its merits. Such a position is, as the Idaho
Supreme Court has explained, untenable.

(See App. Br., pp.9-11 (discussing the

Supreme Court’s precedent on this point in depth).)
Since Mr. Smith presented a non-frivolous Rule 35 claim supported by new or
additional information which had not, to that point, been presented to the district court,
the district court erred in denying his motion for appointment of counsel.
B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Smith’s Rule 35 Motion
The State’s responses concerning the district court’s ruling on the merits of

Mr. Smith’s Rule 35 motion are not remarkable, and as such, no further reply is
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necessary in regard to those issues. Accordingly, Mr. Smith simply refers the Court
back to pages 12-13 of his Appellant’s Brief.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Smith respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order denying his Rule
35 motion and that it remand this case to the district court for further proceedings
following appointment of counsel.

Alternatively, he requests this Court reduce his

sentence as it deems appropriate, or else, vacate the order denying his Rule 35 motion
and remand the case for further proceedings.
DATED this 14th day of July, 2016.

_________/s/________________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

8

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of July, 2016, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
DANIEL JOSEPH SMITH
INMATE #69623
NCWC
1640 11TH AVENUE NORTH
NAMPA ID 83687
SAMUEL A HOAGLAND
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF

__________/s/_______________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
BRD/eas
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